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The contemporary international scene poses a challenge not
just to international law, and not just to international lawyers, but
to those of us who teach international law as well. The world is
looking less to international law than it was a generation ago.
Right after World War II and the founding of the United Nations,
we talked about having a world under international law and about
achieving peace through law. Fewer and fewer statesmen talk like
that today. The states and statesmen appear to ignore international
law. The United States responds to a Mayaguez incident without
even mentioning its United Nations obligation to exhaust peaceful
approaches before resorting to force. Israel supports military elements in southern Lebanon that oppose the United Nations. The
International Court of Justice, which our newly elected Judge,
Richard Baxter, is about to join, is practically without business.
Disputes are argued in political terms and yet at the same time, as
Dean Rusk pointed out, there has never been a greater need for a
scheme of law. We have new problems; the world is becoming increasingly interdependent and increasingly complex.
Faced with this challenge, what do we international law
professors do? We sit, it seems to me, like monks in a monastery
holding our precious rules and saying that sooner or later the world
is bound to come to its senses. When statesmen finally see that the
world doesn't work without law, we will have the law intact for
them. We tend to say, "Naughty, naughty. You broke a rule here;
you broke a rule there. You really ought to try to exercise more
restraint."
Now this can be seen as a typical dispute between academics
on the one side and active politicians on the other. We say, "International law is important. You are legally bound by it." Mr. Kis*
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singer, or someone of his point of view, will say, "Who is going to
sue me? Who says there is international law and who is around to
enforce it?" We look at international problems from a legal point
of view from within the legal system. They look at problems from a
policy point of view from within the political system. In this dispute, as in others, the first thing to do is to see the problem as they
see it.
In any dispute, whether its an international dispute or a dispute of another kind, the first task is to put ourselves in their shoes.
Let us look at the problem the way a statesman sees it. If we want
national decisions to be affected by international law, we need to
understand national perceptions and a statesman's interests. If we
want to educate or influence statesmen, the starting point is their
present perceptions. A government official, a statesman, is likely to
see international law in the first place as irrelevant and secondly as
a purported (and ineffective) restraint on what he is supposed to do.
We are coming around and saying, "No, no, no, no." The perception of the politician is that he or she deals with the real world of
today, of guerillas, of nuclear missiles, of armed mobs, of tanks, of
covert operations, of Vietnams, of Rhodesias, of Chinas, superpower conflicts, confrontations, and South Africas. He must take
into account vital national interests. Among these concerns he believes he should pay little or no attention to what some international law professor may say is wrong with what he did. For a
statesman caught up in the Iranian crisis of today, what some professor may write in the American Journalof InternationalLaw next
year is not very important. Many of you heard Dean Acheson say
that in the Cuban missile crisis law was wholly irrelevant and that
what Quincy Wright would say next quarter in his article criticizing
what the United States had done was to be given short shrift.
What do we say to answer that perception? Will all our talk
about legal duty persuade them to abandon the world of realpolitik
for the academic concerns of law professors? I think not. International law will affect what decisionmakers do to the extent that it is
functional for them - to the extent that it helps them identify their
goals and accomplish them. Instead of looking at international law
as a restraint, it seems to me that we have to look at it as a way of
serving the interests of those who are trying to serve the public interest of their nations. We have to show them that it will help them
do their job and do it better. To convince our students of the relevance of international law, we have to convince them that at critical
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points of choice international law helps provide wiser and more effective decisions. Properly seen from the statesman's point of view,
international law is not an academic restraint but, as I suggested in
the title of these remarks, a boxful of helpful tools.
What are statesmen's objectives which international law helps
accomplish? A statesman is like a poker player who has arrived in
New Guinea and is playing a game of poker but is not quite sure of
the local rules of the game. Like any poker player, he has three
kinds of interests. His first interest, of which he is most aware, is to
win the hand. He wants to prevail in the immediate situation. He
wants what he wants when he wants it. He wants victory.
Whatever the dispute is about, he wants to have his way.
The second kind of objective that a poker player has, and
shares with a statesman, is the objective of being in a good position
for the next hand. He wants to be able to influence future events.
He wants to have a stack of chips on hand and a reputation perhaps a reputation for not bluffing and for standing by what he
says. He wants power.
The third thing that a poker player wants is to have nobody
kick over the table. All of his winnings and all of his reputation
will not amount to much if there is a gun battle and the poker table
is upset. He wants peace. Each statesman has these three identifiable interests in victory, power, and peace, or in winning, in influence, and in some form of order.
Those interests are there, and they exist all the time. There is
no way in which one interest can always be put above another.
You cannot say that I am interested only in peace, or only in victory. The two have to be reconciled. I am reminded of the time
when I was in the Solicitor General's office arguing cases for the
Government and had won several in a row. At one point, I went in
to see Oscar Davis, who was then the first assistant to the Solicitor
General, and I asked, "Did you see this morning that two more
cases came down that I argued?" He made a crack, which I have
long since forgotten, but I have not forgotten what he then said:
"We don't want to win all the cases." I said, "What?" He said,
"We don't want to win every case. Did you ever think what would
happen if the government won every case in the Supreme Court?
The entire concept of government under law would be down the
drain. Everything we care about would be gone. This would be a
dictatorship, a totalitarian society in which the government always
wins. Respect for the judiciary would be gone. Prosecutors would
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1979
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run amuck. It would be a disaster if we won every case." And I
said, "Oscar, what am I doing up there?" He replied, "We want to
win each case, but not every case."
The international statesman has the same dilemma. He wants
to win each dispute, but he knows that no other player will stay in a
game in which one player wins all the time. The OAS is meaningless if the United States can use it purely as a rubber stamp with
everyone raising their hand and voting aye. The United Nations is
worthless if any one state wins all the time. Winning doesn't
amount to anything. It loses all significance.
Those three objectives - the objective of winning each hand
but not every hand, the objective of being in a good position, and
the objective of having an orderly game, we can pursue in three
different ways. Internationally, we can do some things by self-help.
We do it ourselves. Such was the conquest of Germany in World
War II. When we use self-help, we do not care about the minds of
others, we simply impose a physical result. But in foreign affairs
there is little we can do that way. Foreign affairs are primarily
other people's affairs. They, not we, make the decisions. So in
most cases we have to work through their minds. This we can do
either by education, that is, by altering their knowledge, attitudes,
or perceptions (such as Voice of America programs, or by our own
conduct) or by influence, that is, by producing specific decisions at
a particular time. Now it turns out that law is a rather effective way
of exerting influence. It is also a way of altering people's perceptions. The United States fails to conquer Mexico not because of the
Mexican army but because we accept the notion that it is not ours.
It is theirs. If we thought it was ours we might feel quite differently
about it. What if the Russians thought Alaska was still legally
theirs? A good legal case, citing current international law that a
dictator cannot permanently alienate the natural resources of a
state, might be made that the Czar was not empowered to sell
Alaska for seven million dollars, and therefore it still belongs to the
Russian people. A good legal case would have enormous political
consequences in affecting what the Soviets wanted. Law is a way of
affecting what people want.
Law is also an effective way of exerting influence on particular
decisions. It is the primary way in which a government influences
its own citizens. By our structuring of the law, and by other legal
techniques, a government can go beyond its borders and influence
others as well. Experience with domestic law shows us how to
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol9/iss2/11

4

Fisher: International Law: A Toolbox for the Statesman
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL

LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 9

make international law relevant. Instead of saying "You can't do
this and you can't do that," we say, "You have got your problems;
you want to have an orderly world; you want to have some power;
you want to have some victories. We have the tools to help you get
them. We have a most influential way to help you get what you
want."
The first way law affects these three goals of victory, power,
and peace is in helping us formulate our goals. Law helps people
understand what they really want in their enlightened self interest.
In his treatise on power politics, Georg Schwarzenberger writes: "It
is the task of the expert to advise the statesman on how a political
objective can be most rationally and effectively attained . . .. He
oversteps his function when he tries to prove that the goal is undesirable."' I disagree. I think that one of the most useful tasks that a
professional can perform is to help a client reexamine what he
thinks he wants and to help him develop goals that more accurately
reflect his enlightened self-interest. I think that one of the key
things that international law can do for national actors and others
in the international community is to serve their interests by helping
them formulate their goals as well as by helping them attain them.
Goals are to be formulated, not found. We should never accept the
notion that you simply scan your mind and say, "What I want is
this and I will go for it." The surest way to fail is to formulate an
unattainable goal. The first important step toward success is to select a goal that is conceivably attainable.
The concept of law provides not only part of an international
orderly world but also a model of what it is that a statesman really
ought to want. Our job is to alter the statesman's perception of
what he really wants, and then to help him get it. In some companies, the general counsel is seen only as a terrible nag who comes
around and says, "No, no; you can't do this; you can't do that."
Those companies generally do not do very well, and the lawyers do
not do very well either. There are other companies where they call
a lawyer in and say, "Look. We think we want to do this. Does
that sound like a good idea? If so, how do we do it? Let's work out
a way to do it. Help us from beginning to end." I think you will
find in a successful multinational corporation that lawyers are in
there at the beginning helping to formulate objectives, to decide
whether they want a merger, whether they want to set up an office
i.
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here or there. Law is taken into account in the planning stage of
selecting a goal as well as in the implementing stage of attaining it.
The statesman thinks he wants to call in an international lawyer and say, "Look, we have a crisis in Iran. What should we do
tomorrow?" He thinks he wants a crisis-reaction system. He wants
to wait until a problem is in the in-box before reacting. A crisis is a
crisis because of high stakes, great uncertainty, and a short time
within which to act. What the statesman really wants, I would try
to convince him, is a functioning system for coping with disputes
before they become crises. We should not wait until there is a
raging epidemic and then say, "Doctor, what do I do?" The way to
avoid epidemics is to inoculate people in advance; to have a system.
Internationally, we also want a system. We would like something
in place so that when a problem comes up our statesman, like the
lieutenant in Casablanca,can, in a very relaxed voice, say, "Round
up the usual suspects." He knows exactly what is going to happen.
There is a routine way for dealing with it. When a ship like the
Mayaguez is seized, our statesman should not have to say, "This is
an international crisis testing my will." Rather he can say, "Make
the usual reports through the usual channels and let's see what happens. Keep the case small. We have a procedure for dealing with
it."
Law not only tells us that our peace objective is a system, law
tells us something about that system. The law about governments
is not criminal law. Criminal law does not work with respect to
governments. In the United States we have a central government
with many subordinate governments. These subordinate governments, like the states of California, Nebraska, and Mississippi, frequently violate our most fundamental law. They pass
unconstitutional statutes. No one has ever suggested that we ought
to bomb Mississippi when it violates the Constitution, or that we
ought to have a Nuremberg trial for the Congressmen who voted
for breaches of our most fundamental law. No. The law of governments is a kind of cease-and-desist type of law. It says we will forget about yesterday but don't do it anymore. We rarely even try to
collect damages. The first time someone sued a state successfully in
this country, the eleventh amendment was promptly adopted to see
that states could not be sued for damages. We use essentially a civil
injunctive model. It treats all violations as disputes. We produce a
determination which is forward-looking, usually prohibitory, and
highly legitimate.
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As international lawyers, we have to convince our clients that
we are here not to say that they are being naughty but to remind
them that what they really want is a system that can handle
problems and make little disputes out of what might be big disputes. We want to keep the hands small so that when we lose some
we lose small ones and so that there is no crisis over what is going
on.
International law not only helps a statesman understand and
formulate his objective of peace as being an orderly world, it helps
him attain it. As we lawyers have learned, one builds a system one
step at a time. Rome was not built in a day and it is unlikely that
we will sit down and draft a great new scheme for the world. A
legal approach can be a case-by-case approach. We should try to
turn each hand, each dispute, into a way of improving the international system.
If we have a dispute with the Soviets, because they are fishing
too close to the New England shore, we could say, "Here is a confrontation between East and West." Better, we can say, "There
seems to be a problem here. What would be a good rule for this
situation that would serve our interests, be tolerable to others, and
might work as a norm?" We identify the conduct we want. We
identify an appropriate general rule. We draft in our minds some
kind of a norm. We figure out ways of establishing that norm as
one to be respected. Shall we do it by tacit agreement, or perhaps
by a unilateral declaration of a 200-mile economic zone? By taking
a lawmaking approach, we can turn a little problem into an excuse
for improving the normative system. We can then do those things
which will tend to cause initial respect for the rules as well as those
which provide a system to cope with disputes and apparent violations.
To improve the international system it helps to treat unmet
needs as reflecting a problem in the legal system. We can try to
meet our legitimate needs as well as the needs of others. As we
look at terrorism, environmental problems, the Middle East, the
Arab-Israeli conflict, a lawyer's approach is to deal with disorder in
an orderly way. We cannot expect to end disorder. Our domestic
experience has taught us that criminal law does not end crime; contract law does not stop broken contracts; tort law does not stop auto
accidents. Law is not a way of ending problems, it is an orderly
way of dealing with them. We should not suggest that once we
have a world of law there will be no problems. We have to expect a
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1979
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world of disputes, conflicts, disorders, and human frailties to continue. We want to try to create norms and a process for dealing
with this disorder in an orderly way.
A legal approach is not only helpful for attaining what we perceive to be a statesman's most important goal, that is, peace in an
orderly world - the goal of not having the table kicked over. A
legal approach also provides crucial tools for helping a statesman
attain those things which he usually thinks even more interesting:
the shorter term goals of power and victory. National power depends on many things, among them military power, legitimate authority, and reputation. Taking a legal approach can have a major
effect on each of those three. Again it helps to consider both the
objectives and how to attain them.
Our military capability is terribly handicapped by the fact that
our weapons designers have not had sufficient legal input. We end
up with hardware which is unusable in most situations. City police
departments have discovered that they do not want a nuclear bomb
in police headquarters to prevent crime. They want rubber bullets,
tear gas, police lines, loudspeakers, a way to stop traffic, and a way
to put a barricade across a street. At the time of the Mayaguez
incident in 1975, the Cambodians were taking what we assumed to
be the crew in a fishing boat toward the mainland. We had the
CoralSea and aircraft all around. We could fly over the fishing
boat at a thousand miles an hour. We could have blown the boat
out of the water. But we had no way of talking with it. We had no
way of stopping it without killing everyone on board. We had no
kind of inflatable hawser that we could drop in front of it. We had
all those great unusable weapons but no practical power, not even
the power to communicate. Why don't we have a portable hotline?
The Cambodians were dying to tell us that they had decided to
release the crew. We were dying to know where the crew was.
They would have been happy to tell us that the crew was not on the
island we were about to attack.
I gave a lecture on the Mayaguez and the total failure of communication to the Naval War College. A Commander at the back
said, "Professor, I was the communications officer on board the
Coral Sea at the time, and we had perfect communication. We
were in touch with the White House every minute of the time." I
replied that if the White House had been the enemy that would
have been fine, but that we were trying to influence other people,
and we had no way of communicating with them. If lawyers
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol9/iss2/11
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thought more about how we could use our force legally, with no
more force than necessary, we would have more power. We should
have weapons with which we could maintain a border whether it be
a barbed wire fence or whatever. We should have the capability to
engage in close reconnaisance during a cease fire, as in the Sinai in
1973. We might have marked the Israeli and Egyptian tanks with
some kind of paint and had photographs of where they were.
Not only should the acquisition of military power be informed
by international legal considerations, our very objective in any future military confrontation is likely to be a legal objective - a
promise. If war breaks out in Europe, involving NATO and the
East Europeans, no one expects that our goal will be to conquer the
Soviet Union, acre by acre. Certainly no one expects that the Soviet Union seeks to conquer the United States. Presumably we
would be using force to try to influence somebody to make a legal
decision - some kind of a cease-fire agreement. International lawyers could begin right now. They could sit down with some Soviets
and work out standard cease-fire agreements that we might want in
a crisis. Someone could pick up the hotline and say, "What about
Draft A? or C?" We will be way ahead of the game. Knowing
what decision we would be trying for is of crucial importance.
A nation can also affect its power by worrying in advance
about its legal authority. The Turks had more power to affect the
Cyprus situation, because in the 1960 Treaty they acquired the legal authority to intervene. The United States had more power in
the Cuban missile crisis because of the Organization of American
States and its resolution. We would have had even more power if,
a year or two ahead of that, we had had the OAS adopt some rules
about a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. The British may have
lost the Suez Canal to Nasser because of their failure to make advance arrangements about their legal authority. Nasser was able to
get away with the Canal in part because he had a very good legal
case. During the whole time between 1888 and 1956, when the
British army was occupying Egypt in various forms, the British
government never bothered to convert their military power into the
legal authority to determine what should happen when the ninetynine year lease expired. My theory is that when the British government was running Egypt, as they did from 1888 to 1922, they could
have established legal arrangements which would have said that
upon the termination of the franchise of the Universal Suez Canal
Company, future procedures would, for example, be decided by arPublished by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1979
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bitration. Such provisions would have altered Nasser's ability unilaterally to take the Canal.
In Guantanamo we made the opposite mistake. We kept our
legal position ahead of our real interests and we became stuck with
a highly expensive base in a communist country where we depend
every day on hundreds of workers coming and going. It is of no
particular use. We are stuck with the problem because of the lack
of advance planning. We have too many legal rights. Our legal
rights exceed our political interests. And we now face political difficulties in giving them up. Our power in a given situation can be
affected by arrangements made in advance with respect to authority.
Our reputation for adhering to international law, for caring
about human rights, for doing things of that kind, can also have a
significant effect.
Law can help us formulate victory objectives. In the Suez crisis, the United Kingdom formulated the objective of toppling Nasser, a goal which they had no legal right to pursue. They largely
failed because they had bitten off more than they could chew more than they had a right to. In the Cuban missile crisis, we were
equally interested in toppling Castro, but wisely did not choose that
as our objective. We limited our objective to one to which we could
plausibly claim we had a legal right under the OAS resolution. By
narrowing it down to one that we could legally pursue, we increased the chance of attaining it. In fact, in the Cuban missile
crisis, President Kennedy said that we had two objectives: the missiles out and on-the-ground inspection. As it turned out, the Soviets had no legal authority to give us on-the-ground inspection.
Kennedy quickly yielded that point and accepted overflights as adequate. So by limiting his goal to one to which he had a fairly
plausible case, he greatly increased the chance of attaining it. I
have argued with some Egyptian friends that if Nasser had only
been smart he could have closed the Gulf of Aqaba in May of 1967
without having a war. When they challenged me and asked how he
could have done that, I tried to draft a hypothetical proclamation
that he might have issued, along the following lines:
Whereas, in response to alleged provocations from Syria,
the Government of Israel is apparently threatening to take military action against Syria,
Whereas, this reaction is not justified, but in any event
under the United Nations Charter a state is not permitted to enhttps://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol9/iss2/11
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gage in retaliation for past misdeeds but can use military force
only for self defense and only to respond to immediate threats;
Whereas, in the view of Egypt, Syria is not now a threat to
Israel;
Whereas, Israel is presently importing petroleum through
the Gulf of Aqaba;
Whereas the Straits of Tiran lie wholly within the sovereign
territory of Egypt;
Whereas it would be a violation of international law for
Egypt knowingly to allow its sovereign territory to be used for
activities in support of an illegal armed attack against Syria;
Whereas Egypt fully recognizes the right of innocent passage through international waterways in times of peace when
such passage is not being used to support the military capability
of a country threatening an armed attack;
And Therefore, accepting its responsibility to the Charter
and to comply with the Security Council in any decision it
makes;
Egypt hereby declares a verification zone in the Straits of
Tiran and decides to stop all ships that have supplies that could
be used to attack Syria. Ships will be detained or sent back. We
will accept the review of the International Court of Justice for
any decisions which are deemed to be improper in any way and
will accept the decisions of the Security Council.
Now if Nasser, instead of making a filabustering speech including
the statement that the Israeli flag was not to be allowed to fly
through the Straits of Tiran, had given a lawyer twenty-four hours
to work out grounds, he could have demonstrated political power
by acting quite nearly lawfully. If he had accepted the review of
the International Court of Justice, it would have been very hard for
Israel to say that his illegal act justified war. He would have enhanced his power by using law to limit his objectives and to justify
his actions.
The Group of 77 now could probably stop all United States
deep seabed mining with a good resolution by the General Assembly. If they simply said that pending agreement on a treaty, anyone
who steals from the common heritage of mankind without having
agreed to turn over to the United Nations fifty percent of the proceeds (or whatever some reasonable figure might be) shall be
treated as a thief. A resolution could say that the General Assembly recommends that all countries treat this as stolen property; that
they do their best to prevent it being taken; that if they capture any
of these nickel nodules and sell them in the marketplace, they can
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1979
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reimburse themselves for their costs, keep half the proceeds for
their trouble, and turn over the balance to the United Nations.
Now a simple resolution recommending such action would so increase the political risks of deep seabed mining that no one would
go into it. It is hard enough right now. If any investor in deep
seabed mining knew that any country in the world could hijack his
supplies, claim to be acting for the United Nations, and keep half
the profits for themselves, no investor would put up the money.
Law is a powerful tool that can be used by big countries and
little ones. The way to sell international law is going to be to show
people how it can help them attain their ends.
Finally, the most crucial question is how law can help someone pursue all three objectives simultaneously. That is, how do you
pursue victory, power, and peace all at the same time? The only
way to do that is to operate under law, to pursue victory within
legal restraints and by lawful procedures. The best political strategy turns out to be a legal strategy.
Multinational corporations have learned how useful lawyers
can be, but it takes lawyers who see their job as promoting the legitimate interests of the client, not one who sees his job as lecturing
clients about what they should not do. International law, substantive and procedural, is a means for each state to define and attain
its true objectives and legitimate interests. When we lawyers look
at international law as a toolbox for enlightened statesmen, statesmen will be more likely to put international law to good use.
Thank you.

Q. Is law really as important as you suggest?
A. I am not saying that law is the only thing in the world - there
is economics, there are tanks, there are guns. What I am saying is
that the question is not how much does law matter, but how? Not,
is economics more important than law? Is military force more important than psychology? Those are poor questions. If I asked you
why you were here today-is it economic, meteorological, geographic, legal considerations-what were they? It is a silly question. But the question is, How do we use economic considerations
to get you here? I give you a ticket. How do we use comfort considerations? We have a nice place to stay. How do we use social
considerations? We have good people here, intellectuals, good
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol9/iss2/11
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company. We are learning how to use the techniques of each discipline to bring about results. I am saying that law is best thought of
not as a brake but as a way of accomplishing objectives. If we think
of law as simply a restraint, saying you cannot do this and you
cannot do that, law will have less impact. If we see law as a tool,
law will earn for itself a larger role. We will have more settled by
legal debate and less by guns.
Q. Are you saying that if a statesmanpays more attention to law he
will do better, even if he "Wins" less? What are his real interests?
A. The interest is in process rather than in result. You have me
basically correct. What I am saying is that law can help people
reformulate their objectives. It helps us understand that what we
want is a system for dealing with crisis rather than to win every
crisis. In a crisis, most statesmen want to win. They think they
want what they want when they want it.
Q.

Is there a downside to the use of law?

A. Yes, there is a downside. I think we have to worry about making things too rigid, too right-and-wrong.
Q9. As I see your position,you are saying that if one side can say
there is a certain morality to his position, he gains the respect of the
whole community and strengthenshis position.
A. My first point is even simpler. Confronted with a highly political world, we should look at law as a method for formulating and
attaining our objectives and not just as a restraint on what people
can do. Then I say that a rule, to be an effective way of affecting
others, must look legitimate to them. It must have some legitimacy
in the eyes of those whom we are trying to influence, not just our
own. And that is essentially what law does. Law tries to say, here
is a norm which we can all respect. If we take our original goals
and formulate them in terms of norms that we can lay on the table
for general acceptance, we will be likely to make others behave a
little better. Whereas if we use guns, demands, and charges, without the legitimacy and morality that the legal notion makes us use,
we will be less effective.
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